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Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance, which appears to be an important issue in corporate governance literature. 
We conduct regression analysis employing a sample of listed companies in the stock 
exchanges of the Baltic States. We test whether increased managerial ownership has effect 
on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). The results reveal 
that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership and internal performance 
measure (ROA) while it does not significantly affect the market performance measure 
(Tobin’s Q). We conclude that management mainly focuses on firm fundamental factors 
and ratios like profitability, sales growth, investment – they have positive relation with 
managerial ownership. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference in market-related 
factors for companies with or without managerial ownership, as these factors in the Baltics 
are more influenced by other considerations like economics, politics and high liquidity 
premium.  
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Introduction and Literature Review 
Relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has received 
much attention in corporate governance literature since the mid-70-ties, when M. 
Jensen and W. Meckling (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explored the principal-agent 
theory, ownership structure, managerial behaviour and agency costs. The idea 
of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained their independence 
(early 90-ties). During the privatization process in early nineties, thanks 
to favourable legislative framework, many ex-ante state-owned companies offered 
shares to their management or all employees on beneficial conditions. In last 
decades, there is a trend for international companies operating in the Baltic market 
to implement their global human resource policy measures. Many of them have 
employee share ownership plans either broad- or narrow- (i.e., management only) 
based. Legislative framework and taxation according to employee share ownership 
in the Baltics has not been supportive.  
The institutional framework under which companies operate in Baltic States 
is quite similar, with some exceptions. In Latvia and Estonia there are no special 
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regulations regarding employee share ownership. For example, there are two 
obstacles in Latvian Commercial Code for implementation of employee share 
ownership. Firstly, it is impossible for companies registered in Latvia to acquire 
their own shares. Secondly, it provides for priority rights for shareholders if the 
share capital is increased, without exception in case of employee shares. Better 
situation is in Lithuania where employee share ownership is regulated in Law of 
Companies and the Law of the Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal 
property. According to regulations companies may issue ordinary shares having the 
status of employee shares and employees have the same rights as regular 
shareholders. At the same time there is no specific regulation on profit sharing. 
In Estonia Commercial Code and Securities Market Law does not contain any 
special regulation on employee share ownership or profit-sharing. In general, legal 
framework on employee share ownerships in the Baltic States is complicated and 
does not support equal and efficient use of employee share ownership. 
The main goal of our research is to evaluate the impact of managerial ownership 
on firm performance in listed companies of the Baltic States. The percentage 
of shares of Baltic listed companies held by management varies from 0% to 94.4%, 
with median value of 27.1% in 2015 (authors’ calculations using on-line data from 
http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com). We can say that it is comparatively high level 
of managerial ownership, as other researchers have found that in Australia 
it is 12.54%, 12.4% in the United States and 13.02% in the United Kingdom (Khan 
et al., 2014). 
Turning to measuring firm performance, we can see that there are different 
approaches of how to ascertain, define and evaluate it. Many studies researching 
companies listed in Anglo-Saxon markets (but not only) concentrate on ratios 
including firm’s market value. Companies of these countries excel with equity-
based financing sources dominance over bank financing, rather diversified 
ownership structures and large number of minority shareholders. Thus, firm 
performance is reflected in its stock price. A common approach to analyse the link 
between managerial ownership and firm performance is regressing Tobin’s Q ratio 
on percentage share of managerial ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Florackis 
et al., 2009; Benson and Davidson, 2009; and others).  
Nevertheless, there are factors affecting share price, like economic environment, 
policy and indicators, market sentiment, industry performance and specifics, 
investor activity and other (we will call them non-managerial factors). In most 
cases, these are very important factors not depending of management performance. 
However, these factors influence the market related firm performance ratios, such 
as Tobin’s Q. Thus, in order to separate the impact of non-managerial factors on 
firm performance, it is useful to include other variables for performance 
measurement that are not affected by the share price. Other researchers use 
accounting profit (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), earnings (in terms of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation or EBITDA) and accrual adjusted 
earnings (Khan et al., 2014), return on assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Cheng 
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et al., 2012; Peni, 2014; Wahba, 2013), return on equity (Gosh, 2006; Short and 
Keasey, 1999), sales to assets ratio (Singh and Davidson, 2003) and other. Many 
authors, including the above mentioned for firm performance evaluation use 
a combination of several different ratios of both types – market value based (like 
Tobin’s Q) and firm based (like profit measures and profitability ratios).  
Turning back to the very often used Tobin’s Q ratio – a number of empirical 
studies reveal non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance, as this link is impacted by two opposite effects: the manager’s 
incentive as shareholder and entrenchment effect. Usually, at high managerial 
ownership levels, the latter effect overpowers the former. 
Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) were the first ones that found the so-called 
“hump-shaped” or “inverted-U” relation between the mentioned variables. Other 
studies have also found the “hump-shaped” relationship. The findings regarding the 
most optimal level of managerial ownership differ across studies. Coles, Lemmon 
and Meschke (2012) find that the maximum point of the hump-shaped relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and CEO ownership is 20.0%. Maximum level discovered 
by Benson and Davidson (2009) where the ownership-performance relation turns 
from positive to negative 28.24%. The evidence of Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan 
(2009) research reveals strong and positive link between managerial ownership and 
firm performance at rather low levels of managerial ownership – lower than 15%. 
Khan, Mather and Balachandran (2014) researched Australian companies and 
found that at 20%-30% of ownership level there is a relation consistent with 
incentive alignment. Mueller and Spitz-Oener (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006) 
find positive managerial ownership – firm performance relation in German SMEs 
up to 40% of managerial shares. However, due to non-listed status of surveyed 
companies, the performance measure they use is slightly different from others – net 
number of times the reported quarter profit has increased. 
Other researchers create exponential models and raising the managerial ownership 
to several degrees (up to quantic). They have found double and more hump-shaped 
curves of managerial ownership and firm performance relation with different 
turning points. Double-humped curves were found by Morck et al. (1988) at 5% 
and 25% level; Short and Keasey (1999) at 13% and 42% level; Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999) at 19.7% and 54.1% level, and others. Florackis et al. (2009) in their model 
with quantic level of managerial ownership find four turning points at 13%, 25%, 
49% and 72% levels. These results are rather close to what Davies et al. (2005) 
have found – 7%, 26%, 51% and 76%. 
Our paper adds to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of managerial 
ownership on firm performance in the Baltic States. 
This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes data and methodology, 
Section 3 presents the results of empirical tests, and Section 4 is for discussion 
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Data and Methodology 
Our data were mainly taken from financial reports of companies listed on Baltic 
stock exchanges (Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius) Official and Second list. Total number 
of companies listed in these lists as of September 2016 is 70. Our sample contains 
information from 52 companies’ reports from 2010 until 2015. Fifteen of these 
companies are listed in Latvia (LV, Riga), 15 – in Estonia (EE, Tallinn), and 22 – 
in Lithuania (LT, Vilnius). We obtained the total sample of 312 firm-year 
observations.  
For our survey, we selected companies that comply with the following criteria: (1) 
the company must be quoted on at least one of the Nasdaq Baltic market stock 
exchanges at least since year 2010; (2) firms that did not disclose information 
regarding management ownership were excluded from our survey. Thus, we 
excluded 18 companies from our sample due to the two reasons: 
1) Newcomers, i.e., companies first listed after 2011, so they do not have sufficient 
reported data. There were 7 such companies, 1 Estonian, 1 Latvian and 
5 Lithuanian; 
2) Insufficient disclosed information regarding managerial ownership. Eleven 
companies did not include information about shareholdings of the top 
management in their financial reports. Ten of them are based in Latvia, and one 
– in Lithuania. 
The data from financial reports and stock exchange homepage were manually 
selected. 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by ownership share of management, 
industry, and stock exchange location. 
 
Table 1. Crosstables of the dataset: managerial ownership by industry and country 











Other EE LV LT Total 
[0…20) 9 4 1 8 1 7 6 10 23 
[20…50) 9 0 1 2 0 3 1 8 12 
[50…70) 5 1 1 5 2 5 5 4 14 
[70…100] 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 3 
Total 25 5 3 16 3 15 15 22 52 
 
We used Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) and return on assets as the dependent variables for 
corporate performance measurement. Tobin’s Q is very widely used by researchers 
inspecting the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Our Tobin’s Q ratio means relation of enterprise value to the book value of assets. 
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We find enterprise value by taking market value of equity plus book value of debt 
minus cash and cash equivalents. We must mention that the surveyed companies 
have no preference shares, thus they are excluded from the enterprise value 
formula. The Tobin’s Q ratio is measured for year 2015. We assume Tobin’s Q 
to capture both external and internal firm performance factors.  
The second dependent variable will be proxy for internal firm performance, more 
related to managerial performance and decisions. The return on assets ratio (ROA) 
is expressed as net profit to the book value of assets ratio. For return on assets, 
we will use average values over the period of 2011-2015. 
The independent variable - managerial ownership (Mgr_O) is expressed as sum 
of percentage share of total equity owned by all executive and non-executive 
directors [all members of Management Board and Supervisory Board
 
] and their 
close relatives (family members) and/or other companies-owners controlled by the 
directors. For independent and control variables, we use average values over the 
period of 2010-2014. 
In order to capture company size, we used such control variables [our selection 
of control variables was based on information availability and variables considered 
in other research papers (see the reference list)] as: 
 Turnover (Ln_S) expressed as natural logarithm of company’s sales; 
 Natural logarithm of market value of equity (Ln_MVEq) which is expressed 
as natural logarithm of average share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding; 
 Natural logarithm of enterprise value (Ln_EV) 
Control variables for capturing ownership concentration are: 
 Ownership concentration [Large shareholders have incentive and ability 
to monitor management (Florackis, 2009)] (O_Conc) – the cumulative amount 
(in percent) of shares of all shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more 
percent; 
 Number of large shareholders (NLS) – number of shareholders having 
ownership stake of 5 or more percent; 
In order to control for other important aspects of firm financial management (level 
of investment, leverage, expenses and profitability) we use these variables: 
 Investment (INV) expressed as relation of capital expenditures to the book 
value of assets; 
 Leverage (LEV) – the ratio of book value of debt to the book value of assets; 
 SGA proportion (SGA) – ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses 
to sales; 
 Payout ratio (PO_R) is for current dividend payout proportion of previous 
year’s net profit; 
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 Return on capital (ROC) – the ratio is found taking earnings before interest and 
taxes of previous year divided by current year’s book value of equity and debt 
minus cash. 
In this paper, we are looking whether there is any relation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance in listed companies of the Baltic States. 
In previous studies, we find quite different results of this relation, found in other 
countries and regions. Thus, our null hypothesis is non-directional: there exists 
no relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the listed 
companies of the Baltic States. 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics information of selected variables in our 
dataset. The descriptive analysis reveals that the managerial ownership variable 
during 2010-2014 was relatively large – on average 30.64% with a maximum and 
minimum value of 94.41% and 0% respectively. Our proxies for market 
performance are Tobin’s Q with a mean value of 0.966, return on assets (mean 
3.37%), sales growth (mean 4.25%) and return on capital (mean: 5.57%). Average 
firm size measured as natural log of enterprise value is 17.515 (equivalent to 40.4 
million euro). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N=52) 
Variables Mean SD Min 1
st
 quartile Median 3
rd
 quartile Max 
TQ 0.966 0.471 0.237 0.698 0.855 1.115 2.410 
ROA 0.034 0.080 -0.209 0.001 0.028 0.065 0.219 
Mgr_O 30.642 26.549 0.000 1.874 24.300 52.236 94.406 
Ln_S 17.248 2.078 9.520 16.324 17.767 18.471 20.665 
Ln_MVEq 16.846 1.986 12.829 14.685 17.262 18.367 20.043 
Ln_EV 17.515 1.996 13.215 16.045 17.873 18.864 21.090 
O_Conc 75.049 15.059 30.850 62.423 77.330 87.550 97.500 
NLS 2.173 1.451 0.000 1.000 1.000 4.000 5.000 
INV 0.045 0.040 0.000 0.012 0.031 0.077 0.158 
LEV 0.424 0.216 0.030 0.263 0.450 0.585 0.910 
SGA 0.184 0.183 0.001 0.066 0.125 0.217 0.932 
S_Gr 0.043 0.157 -0.482 -0.018 0.026 0.083 0.382 
ROC 0.056 0.098 -0.148 0.015 0.052 0.081 0.441 
PO_R 0.316 0.610 -1.526 0.000 0.062 0.446 2.235 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dataset variables. It reveals 
that only a few of the selected variables correlate with managerial ownership – 
return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (S_GR) have low degree of positive 
correlation. Positive correlation among managerial ownership and ROA suggests 
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that improvement the internal growth factor performance might be of more 
importance to management than the market value factors.  
 









NLS INV LEV SGA ROA 
TQ -.026 1 
        
LN_SALES -.058 .184 1 
       
LN_MVEQ -.166 ,357** ,839** 1 
      
LN_EV -.206 ,327* ,844** ,955** 1 
     
NLS ,350* -.247 -.077 -.182 -.154 1 
    
INV .192 ,421** .150 .123 .016 -,324* 1 
   
LEV -.120 .072 .242 .043 ,297* .052 -.271 1 
  
SGA .098 -.015 -,385** -.241 -,278* .195 -.245 -.154 1 
 
ROA ,294* ,375** ,394** ,497** ,338* -.122 ,446** -,339* -.186 1 
S_GR ,296* -.030 .244 .091 .055 .100 ,356** -.023 -,325* ,312* 
ROC .246 ,348* ,327* ,340* .201 -.081 ,410** -,297* -.209 ,880** 
PO_R -,329* ,341* ,295* ,366** ,341* -,414** ,278* -.093 -.249 .128 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The correlation matrix reveals that market value related variables (Tobin’s Q, 
market value of equity and enterprise value) are most affected by return on assets, 
return on capital and payout ratio. Investment variable correlates with the internal 
growth ratios and payout ratio. Overall, correlations among the independent 
variables are rather low.  
Regression Results 
This paper conducts a regression analysis using Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure 
firm performance. In Table 4, managerial ownership proportion serves as the main 
explanatory variable together with the control variables: natural logarithm of sales, 
leverage and investment.  
 
Table 4. OLS Regression results with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables 
(N=52), unstandardized coefficients 
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.475 .430 10.632 .000 
 
In the regression where Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable (Model 1) we 
can see that the variable of managerial ownership is not significantly different from 
zero in terms of error size together with natural logarithm of sales and leverage. 
The investment variable is significant. When we test the significance of the 
regression as a whole, the F-test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that 
jointly equal to zero at 0.05 probability level.    
The regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2) has larger 
explanatory power. We reject the null hypothesis for all the independent variables 
of being equal to zero. The regression coefficients such as sales, investment and 
managerial ownership have positive influence on the return on assets, while higher 
level of leverage affects the return negatively.  
We also carried out the regression equations with squared and cubed Mgr_O 
variable in order to check whether the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance might be non-linear. Nevertheless, it did not change the 
result, meaning that increase of ownership proportion would not have significant 
impact on firm performance.  
Results Discussion  
Since 1976, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling revealed the principal-agent theory, 
there has developed a parallel scientific discussion about managerial ownership and 
employee ownership, and its features of aligning interests of managers and 
employees with investors’ interests and goals. From the other side, there is the 
entrenchment effect that, in case of comparatively large share of managerial 
ownership, penetrates and management avoids more profitable projects instead 
of less, fearing from risk.  
Large portion of existing literature concerning managerial ownership and firm 
performance finds the mentioned two contrary impact factors ownership-
performance relation. These factors induce a hump-shaped relation of the above-
mentioned variables with the highest point at 15–30 percent level of managerial 
ownership, depending on the study specifics (Morck et al., 1988; Coles et al., 2012; 
Benson and Davidson, 2009; Khan et al., 2014). The evidence mainly relies on data 
from listed companies in large developed capital markets, most of them originated 
in Anglo-Saxon countries (especially the UK and US). A study in German SMEs 
(Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006) reveals a 40% managerial ownership optimum 
promoting the best performance results. Nevertheless, this study uses different 
methodology. 
The results of our study do not support the findings regarding managerial 
ownership link with firm performance in other markets worldwide, measured 
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by Tobin’s Q. Thus, contrary to other studies, we did not detect a particular 
optimum of managerial ownership proportion in companies listed on the Baltic 
stock exchanges nor a hump-shaped ownership-performance relation. We assume 
that Tobin’s Q in our case is an inappropriate measure for firm performance only, 
as the firm’s market value is highly affected by external factors (macroeconomics, 
politics, investor sentiment) and high stock liquidity premium (Lieksnis, 2010) 
in Baltic stock markets. The management of companies – neither owners, nor non-
owners – cannot directly affect these factors. For this reason, we used our data 
to create a parallel model using more firm-related ratios.  
We carried out a regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2). 
It showed better results with higher explanatory power. The model includes such 
independent variables as managerial ownership, natural logarithm of sales, 
leverage and investment. Managerial ownership appears to be statistically 
significant only in Model 2, although with a very low coefficient (0.01), and only 
at 0.05 probability level. These results are consistent with findings of other 
researchers as well – Khan et al. (2014) in a study of Australian companies; Cheng 
et al. (2012) find that in Hong Kong market firm performance is negatively related 
with managerial ownership if its share is less than 22.18% or more than 78.02%. 
Researching companies in Egypt, Wahba (2013) concludes that neither Tobin’s Q 
nor ROA give statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and 
firm performance.   
Conclusions 
In this paper, we estimate the managerial ownership and firm performance 
parameters using data from 2010–2015 financial reports of 52 companies listed 
on Nasdaq Riga, Nasdaq Tallinn and Nasdaq Vilnius stock exchanges. This is the 
first such attempt to measure managerial ownership impact on firm performance 
for listed companies in the Baltics.  
One of the reasons why there is no significant relation between managerial 
ownership and firm’s market performance (Tobin’s Q) is that due to historical and 
sociological factors, management of the listed companies in the Baltics is not 
focused on the market value of stocks. The stock markets are relatively small and 
illiquid, and ownership is more concentrated than in the developed markets, where 
it is more dispersed. Rather managers’ motivators and bonuses depend 
on fundamental results of the company and their profits. 
There also can be other reasons for the difference in results regarding ownership-
performance relation compared to findings from other countries, such as the 
relatively small sample size, scope of the study, performance variables selection, 
regional corporate governance and culture specifics, methodological approach and 
many other. This leads us to implications for further research that should 
be developed in the of corporate governance matters in the Baltics – it can 
be focused on more detailed ownership structure including institutional owners, 
government and/or family ownership matters and their influence on various 
2017 
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business performance measures. The geography of the survey can be extended 
including other countries located in Eastern Europe. 
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WŁASNOŚĆ ZARZĄDCZA I WYDAJNOŚĆ FIRMY: PRZYKŁAD FIRM 
KRAJÓW BAŁTYCKICH 
Streszczenie: Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na relacjach między własnością 
kierowniczą a wydajnością firmy, co wydaje się być ważną kwestią w literaturze dotyczącej 
ładu korporacyjnego. Przeprowadzono analizę regresji, wykorzystując próbę składającą 
się ze spółek notowanych na giełdach państw bałtyckich. Sprawdzono, czy zwiększona 
własność kierownicza wpłynęła na wydajność firmy mierzoną przy użyciu współczynnika 
Q-Tobina i stopy zwrotu z aktywów (ang. Return on assets, ROA). Wyniki pokazują, 
że istnieje pozytywna zależność pomiędzy własnością kierowniczą a wewnętrznym 
wskaźnikiem wydajności (ROA), podczas gdy nie wpływa to znacząco na miarę 
wydajności rynkowej (Q-Tobina). Podsumowując, kierownictwo koncentruje się głównie 
na podstawowych czynnikach i wskaźnikach, takich jak rentowność, wzrost sprzedaży oraz 
inwestycje mające pozytywny związek z własnością kierowniczą. Tymczasem nie ma 
znaczącej różnicy w czynnikach związanych z rynkiem spółek posiadających lub 
nieposiadających własności kierowniczej, ponieważ te czynniki w krajach bałtyckich 
są bardziej uzależnione od innych kwestii, takich jak ekonomia, polityka czy wysoka 
premia z tytułu płynności. 
Słowa kluczowe: Własność kierownicza, wydajność firmy, współczynnika Q-Tobina, 
stopa zwrotu aktywów (ROA), państwa bałtyckie 
經營所有權和公司業績：上市公司在證券市場上的證據 
摘要：本文重點介紹了管理層所有權與企業績效之間的關係，這似乎是公司治理文
獻中的一個重要課題。我們使用波羅的海國家證券交易所上市公司的樣本進行回歸
分析。我們測試是否增加管理所有權對托賓Q和資產回報率（ROA）衡量的企業績效
有影響。結果表明，管理所有權與內部績效指標（ROA）之間存在正相關關係，但對
市場績效指標沒有顯著影響（托賓Q）。我們得出結論，管理層主要關注企業的基本
因素和利潤率，銷售增長率，投資比例，與管理所有權有正相關關係。同時，由於
這些因素在波羅的海經濟，政治和高流動性溢價等因素影響較大的情況下，與管理
所有權有關的公司的市場相關因素沒有顯著差異。 
關鍵詞:管理所有權，企業績效，托賓Q，ROA，波羅的海國家。 
 
 
 
